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I. INTRODUCTION
Essentially, this Comment will address the aftermath of the United States
Supreme Court's recent Establishment Clause decision, Board of Education of
Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grnet,1 and attempt to answer two
questions: (1) does the Court's fractured opinion provide any stability or
predictability for Establishment Clause jurisprudence? and (2) what is the likely
impact of this case upon governmental attempts to sensitively accommodate
cultural and ethnic diversity when religious adherents are incidentally involved?
In Part II, I will briefly present observations on the American cultural
context in which this case is ironically situated. In addition, I will describe the
Establishment Clause jurisprudential context of the case.2 Part Il will present
the factual background of the case. In Part IV, I will describe the Supreme
Court's unique handling of Kryas Joel-the plurality opinion by Justice
Souter, the four concurrences, and the dissent. Part V will present analysis of
the result of this case and recommendations to resolve the problems made
obvious by the Court's decision. Finally, Part VI will briefly conclude this
Comment.
I. PROLEGOMENA
A. Living in the U.S.A.
Over the last twenty-five years in the United States, as a result of
affirmative efforts on the part of numerous public and private entities, 3
1 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
2 Because of the very limited scope of this Comment, I will not provide the reader a
thorough historical analysis of the Establishment Clause, or the religion clauses generally.
Many fine articles and books are available. See generally CHEsTER JAMES ANTiEAU ET AL.,
FREEDOM FROM ESTABLISHMENT: FORMATION AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT RELIGiON CLAUSES (1964); ROBERT L. CoRD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE: HISTORICAL FACr AND CURRENT FICriON (1982); George Anastaplo, Amendments to
the Constitution of the United States: A Commentary, 23 Loy. U. Cm. L.. 631 (1992);
Rodney J. Blackman, Showing the Fly the Way Out of the Bottle: Making Sense of the First
Amendment Religion Causes, 42 KAN. L. REV. 285 (1994); Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a
General Theory of the Establishment Cause, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 1113 (1988).
3 These entities include, for example, government agencies and organizations, schools,
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Americans have grown more cognizant of their diversity.4 The myth of the
melting pot has dissipated and seems supplanted by recognition and affirmation
of our collective differences.5 Presently, one regularly hears the call to
understand and even celebrate differences. Physical, mental, racial, sexual
orientation, gender, cultural, religious and ethnic differences provide a starting
point for dialogue rather than an endpoint. Thus, for many, the call to
affirmation and celebration of diversity represents a change in the American
cultural milieu.
6
various religious organizations and adherents, civil rights organizations and individual
activists, and the mass media.
4 See generally LEONARD D. CAIN, THE EMERGING MINoPImES (1991) (discussing the
recent emergence of non-ethnic minorities (women, the elderly, the disabled, and
homosexuals), their experience and effect on culture); THEODORE CAPLOW, AMERICAN
SOCIAL TRENDs (1991) (discussing numerous socio-cultural trends from 1960-90. Of
particular interest are recent trends related to work, government, religion, ethnicity, and
social movements).
5 Steven M. Tipton has observed that:
In fact, contrary to philosophical liberals and their communitarian critics alike,
what holds us together as a polity and a people is not some comprehensive cultural
agreement conceived as a value-consensus, or as a value-free arrangement of rules and
rights to coordinate our disparate interests and ideals across seamless subcultural
communities. Rather, we are held together by the coherence of our moral disagreement
and argument within an ongoing cultural conversation that embraces multiple moral
traditions, languages, practices, and social settings.... The moral argument of public
life goes on within each one of us and among all of us, because we all share a common
culture woven of contrasting moral traditions that themselves embody continuities of
conflict over how we ought to live together. And all of us lead lives that span the
different social institutions and practices to which traditions ring more or less true,
including a polity that is at once a religious republic and a liberal constitutional state.
Steven M. Tipton, An American Paradox: The Place of Religion in an Ambiguous Polity, in
THE POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF RELIGION 273, 277 (Said Amir Arjomand ed., 1993)
(footnote omitted).
6 Of course, this is not to say greater sensitivity and tolerance have automatically
accompanied the recognition of diversity. One need only witness the pejorative use of the
term "politically correct" to understand that the call to celebration and sensitivity has not
gone unchallenged. See Robert Kerr, Diversity Police Oppressors, Too, in Writer's Eyes,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 8, 1995, at 6G. Kerr reviews Richard Bernstein's new book
DICrATORSHIP OF VIRTUE: MULTICULTURALISM AND THE BATTLE FOR AMERICA'S FuruRE
(1994). Id. Kerr states that "Bernstein identifies multiculturalism as a growing threat and
revival of '60s Marxism." Id. According to Kerr, Bernstein argues that advocates of
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In the context of this cultural milieu, some citizens expect and even
demand that governmental responses to serious societal or community problems
show awareness and sensitivity to diversity. Further, many citizens require
government to attempt, whenever possible, to accommodate cultural and ethnic
diversity. Thus, it is difficult to imagine that a problem of constitutional
magnitude would result because the New York Legislature enacted preferential
legislation that allowed a group of mentally and physically challenged children
from a small ethnic community to attend public school in their own
community. In Kryas Joel, the U.S. Supreme Court wrestled with the question
of whether the New York State Legislature's enactment of special legislation
granting a village authority to accommodate the special education needs of their
children without violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 7
In a divided and troubling opinion, the Court answered no, declaring such an
"accommodation" constituted a violation of the Establishment Clause.8
B. The Establishment Clause
Generally, one willingly accepts Chief Justice John Marshall's declaration
in Marbury v. Madison9 that it is the exclusive province of the Court is to
declare what the law is.10 Many even agree with Charles Evans Hughes that
"[w]e are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it
multiculturalism and recognition of diversity are more interested in imposing politically
correct attitudes than free expression of diverse opinions, i.e., multiculturalists are the new
oppressors. Id. Nevertheless, in spite of recalcitrance on the part of some individuals,
recognition and appreciation of our diversity seems secure.
These cultural observations are the author's. They are not based upon scientific
research of a sociological or political nature. Rather, the cultural research basically entailed
holding a licked finger in the air in order to feel the present American cultural wind.
Admittedly, cultural winds change and are mysterious. These observations are not offered
as conclusions. The author proposes nothing to the reader beyond the mere suggestion that
as a culture, America is changing. Additionally, to a certain extent, the differences once
considered a divisive force we now regard positively. To assess the direction of American
culture, the author collected data from a variety of sources, including but not limited to
radio broadcasts and radio talk shows. In addition, magazine and newspaper articles related
to "political correctness" were randomly sampled.
7 Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2484
(1994).
8Id.
9 5 U.S. 137 (1803).10Id. at 177.
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is."" Difficulty arises, however, when our hopes for clarity, understanding,
guidance and uniformity in the law's interpretation are dashed by confusing and
inconsistent decisions by the Court. The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
cases are a prime example of Court created and perpetuated confusion.
The First Amendment's religion clauses state: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof ... ."12 Read alone, one would never suspect that some "talismanic
catchword, test, or methodology" 13 is necessary to understand what the
Constitution prohibits. Rather, one suspects the words simply mean that
government may not act with a religious purpose or under religious influence,
and government must refrain from intruding into the sphere of private religious
practice. Further, one likely would join Jonathan E. Nuechterlein in the belief
that the two aspects of the First Amendment's religion clauses are not in
conflict but are correlative-each defining the limits of the other.14
Nevertheless, the Court recently made clear that a special hermeneutic is
required to understand the Establishment Clause. 15
Persons familiar with this area of law recognize that inconsistency and
11 FRANK J. SORAUF, THE WALL OF SEPARATION: THE CONSTrrUTIONAL POLrrICs oF
CHURCH AND STATE 3 (1976) (quoting Hughes' words as "immortalized" by President
Franklin D. Roosevelt in his March 9, 1937 fireside chat).
12 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
13 Benjamin D. Feder, And A Child Shall Lead Them. Justice O'Connor, The Principle
of Religious Liberty and Its Practical Application, 8 PACE L. REv. 249, 250 (1988).
14 Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, The Free Exercise Boundaries of Pennissible
Acconodation Under the Establishment Clause, 99 YALE L.J 1127, 1146 (1990); see also
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 795, 798 (1993)
(stating that the Establishment Clause, to protect religious liberty, prohibits states from
prescribing religious exercise, and the Free Exercise Clause, in order to protect religious
liberty, prohibits government from proscribing religious exercise).
15 1 am not suggesting a naive literalist interpretation of the religion clauses. That
approach would solve few if any of our courts' present problems. Furthermore, textual
exegesis offers little, and eisegesis, as the courts have performed it, has created doctrinal
incoherence. In addition, I do not believe that looking to the constitutional framers' intent
will solve the problems. First, how would we determine their intent? Second, whose intent
ought we accord the greatest deference? And on it goes. See generally CoRD, supra note 2
(discussing and comparing Madison's and Jefferson's words and deeds related to church and
state relations, which are considerably foreign to the contemporary mythologizing that both
the Supreme Court and separationist commentators have indulged in); ANT1EAU, supra note
2. Frankly, the interpretations offered by the separationists and the accommodationists offer
little. Ultimately, it is clear that a new approach to understanding church and state relations
is needed. See infra part V.
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confusion are nothing new. Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been
universally criticized as logically inconsistent, contradictory, and hopelessly
confusing. 16 Even the Court "itself has acknowledged its own 'considerable
internal inconsistency,' candidly admitting that it has 'sacrifice[d] clarity and
predictability for flexibility' .... "17
Since Everson v. Board of Education,18  Establishment Clause
jurisprudence has been "mired in slogans and multipart tests that could be
manipulated to reach almost any result." 19 The most broadly adopted, applied
and criticized of these tests, the three-part Lemon test, assembled by the Court
in Lemon v. Kurtzman,20 has served numerous courts in a myriad of cases
determining whether an Establishment Clause violation has occurred. In
Lemon, the Court united three tests that it gleaned from the Court's
Establishment Clause cases. For legislation or governmental conduct to be
constitutional under the Establishment Clause: (1) it must have a secular
purpose; (2) it must not have a principle or primary effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion; and (3) it must not foster excessive entanglement between
government and religion.21 Unfortunately, the Lemon test's ambiguity has led
to sharp criticism by commentators and members of the Supreme Court itself.
According to Michael Stokes Paulson, "[t]he criticism [i]s well deserved. Each
of Lemon's three 'prongs'... ha[s] some major analytical flaw .... Not all
of the ... decisions [a]re wrong, of course, but they certainly lacked doctrinal
coherence."22
This lack of doctrinal coherence seems to have motivated the Court to
move in its recent cases toward abandoning the Lemon test. Michael W.
McConnell suggests that "it is increasingly evident that the Lemon test is
16 See William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It" The Supreme Court and
Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 495, 495-97 (1986); see also Feder, supra note 13;
Craig L. Olivo, Note, Grumet v. Board of Education of the Kiryas Joel Village School
Dist.-When Neutrality Masks Hostility-The Exclusion of Religious Communities from an
Entitlement to Public Schools, 68 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 775, 813 (1993).
17 Marshall, supra note 16, at 497 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting
from Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) and Committee for Pub. Educ. and
Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980)).
18 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The Court, quoting Thomas Jefferson, declared that the
Establishment Clause "was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between Church and
State.'" Id. at 16 (citation omitted).
19 Michael W. McConnell, Accomnodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to
the Critics, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 685, 685 (1992).
20 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
21 Id. at 612-13.
22 Paulsen, supra note 14, at 800-01.
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largely irrelevant or indeterminate when applied to most serious establishment
issues."23 Nevertheless, lower courts, particularly state courts, continue to
apply the Lemon test. Kiryas Joel, which originated in the New York state
courts, is such an example. Each state court that Kiryas Joel passed through on
its way to the Supreme Court decided the case based upon application of the
Lemon test.24 Each court found the legislation in question constitutionally
invalid, but for different reasons. When the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in iryas Joel, many hoped for resolution of the Establishment Clause doctrinal
chaos. However, as this Comment will illustrate,25 little clarity appears gained
by the Court's intervention.26
IH. BACKGROUND: THE KIRYASJOEL FACTS
Kiryas Joel originated in the Supreme Court of Albany County, New York
when taxpayers and the New York State School Boards Association (NYSBA)
brought suit challenging the constitutionality of a state statute passed in 1989
that specially created the Kiryas Joel Village School District (KJVSD). 27 The
constitutional infringement claim centered on the fact that the school district's
boundaries were contiguous with the village's boundaries. 28 Grumet29 (one of
23 McConnell, supra note 19, at 685-86.24 Grumet v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 579 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1007 (Sup. Ct. 1992),
afj'd sub nom. Grumet v. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 592 N.Y.S.2d
123, 126-27 (App. Div. 1992),judgment modified, 618 N.E.2d 94 (N.Y. 1993), aftid, 114
S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
25 See infra parts IV, V.
26 Perhaps, as Phillip E. Johnson seems to suggest, in the religion clause area, the
Supreme Court has met its match:
Despite the most determined efforts of the Justices and the scholars, no single logical
framework seems capable of explaining the law.
Many areas of constitutional law are unsettled, of course, but in most areas the
uncertainty concerns how far the Constitution requires us to go in a particular direction.
In the religion clause area, even the general direction is often difficult to ascertain.
Phillip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72
CAL. L. REv. 817, 819 (1984).27 Grnet, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 1005-06. The statute at issue was 1989 N.Y. LAWS ch.
748.
28 Id. at 1005.
29 Initially, Louis Grumet and Albert W. Hawk sued both in their individual capacities
as taxpayers and as officers of the NYSBA. Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel
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the taxpayer plaintiffs and a member of the NYSBA) sought the court's
declaratory judgment that the statute violated both equal protection and church-
state separation. 30
The Village of Kiryas Joel is a religious enclave, incorporated since 1977
under New York law. 31 The villagers are predominantly Satmarer Hasidim,32 a
"vigorously religious" Jewish sect which strictly interprets and follows the
Torah.33 In Kiryas Joel, sexes are segregated outside of the home; Yiddish is
the primary language; radio and television are not generally used; and villagers
wear distinctive Hasidic dress. 34 Furthermore, boys and girls from Kiryas Joel
receive their education in separate private schools that do not offer special
education programs for special needs children.35
The children requiring special education have been the center of
controversy for nearly ten years. In 1984 the Monroe-Woodbury Central
School District (M-WCSD) provided special education for the villagers'
children at an annex to the private girls-school, Bais Rochel. 36 Unfortunately,
in response to the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Aguilar v. Felton37 and
Grand Rapids v. Ball,38 M-WCSD terminated the shared space program. 39 As
a result, the only opportunity for special education for the children was in the
Village Sch. Dist., 592 N.Y.S.2d 123, 126-27 (App. Div. 1992), judgment modified, 618
N.E.2d 94 (N.Y. 1993), af'd, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994). However, New York's Appellate
Division ruled that the NYSBA and its officers lacked standing to challenge the statute's
constitutionality. K.
30 G&net, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 1006.
31 Grumet v. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 618 N.E.2d 94, 110-
11 (N.Y. 1993) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting), aft'd, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
32 For an interesting and thorough historical and cultural description and analysis of
Satmarer Hasidim see ISRAEL RUBiN, SATMAR: AN ISLAND IN THE CrrY (1972).
33 Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2485
(1994).
34 Grmet, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 1005.
35 Kryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2485.
36 Id.
37 473 U.S. 402 (1985). In Aguilar, the Supreme Court declared that aid to parochial
schools providing on site remedial education violated the Establishment Clause. Id.
38 473 U.S. 373 (1985). Ball, a companion case to Aguilar, held remedial programs
offered in parochial schools at public expense violated the Establishment Clause. Id. See
Von G. Keetch, Grand Rapids School District v. Ball: An Educational Perspective on the
Evolution of Lemon, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 489 (discussing the Court's determination of an
Establishment Clause violation upon the finding of a crucial symbolic link representing
dependency between the government and the religious denomination whose school shared
time). Id.
39 KiryasJoel, 114 S. Ct. at 2485.
1995]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
existing programs offered by the M-WCSD outside of the village.40
The parents of the special needs children attempted to integrate their
children into M-WCSD schools, but the children experienced such severe
emotional distress41 that nearly all parents withdrew their children from
school. 42 The parents then demanded provision of special education within
their village at a neutral site.43 This, however, was subject to litigation that
resulted in a New York Court of Appeals decision holding that the provision of
special education at a neutral site is discretionary on the part of a school district
and not mandatory under federal or state law.44 It was at this point that the
New York Legislature passed the controversial legislation45 that eventually
40 Id. Under both federal and state law, Kiryas Joel's special needs children are
entitled to access to programs and services that meet their special needs. See Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1990); N.Y. EDUC. LAW,
§§ 1701-1726 (McKinney 1988); N.Y. EDUC. LAw, §§ 4401-4410-a (McKinney 1995).
41 Evidently, the children were traumatized by having to leave the village and travel
some distance from home to receive their education in the strange and unfamiliar
environment of the M-WCSD schools. The children's physical appearance, dress, and
language differences compounded the impact of the unfamiliar environment by noticeably
setting them apart from the other students. See Brief for Petitioner Board of Education of
the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District at 5, Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994)
(Nos. 93-517, 93-527, 93-539).
4 2 KiryasJoel, 114 S. Ct. at 2485.
43 Id.
4 4 Board of Educ. v. Wieder, 527 N.E.2d 767 (N.Y. 1988).
45 The legislation provided:
The territory of the Village of Kiryas Joel in the Town of Monroe, Orange County, on
the date when this act shall take effect, shall be and hereby is constituted a separate
school district, and shall be known as the Kiryas Joel Village School District and shall
have and enjoy all of the powers and duties of a union free school district under the
provisions of the Education Law.
Grumet v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 579 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1006 (Sup. Ct. 1992)
(citation omitted), affid sub nom. Grumet v. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch.
Dist., 592 N.Y.S.2d 123 (App. Div. 1992), judgment modified, 618 N.E.2d 94 (N.Y.
1993), aft'd, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994). Further:
Section (2) of the legislation provides for the newly created District to be under the
control of a Board of Education composed of between five and nine members elected
by the qualified voters of the Village of Kiryas Joel. Finally, the bill provides that the
terms of members of the school board shall not exceed five years.
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came under U.S. Supreme Court review. 46
IV. ESTABLISHMENT BY DELEGATION OF STATE AUTHORITY
As stated in the preceding discussion, each of the state courts found the
statute creating the KJVSD invalid. The reasoning under and application of the
Lemon test were somewhat varied. Consequently, one expected that the U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari to correct some significant aberration in the
state courts' application of Lemon. Further, one expected that the Supreme
Court intended to rectify the imbalances witnessed in the courts' analysis, at
least to the extent that some reasonable policy would evolve. Unfortunately,
this was not the case. Instead, the Court produced a confusingly fractured
opinion that leaves one with the distinct feeling that perhaps the Court should
have left the case alone.
A. We Know Establishment Is Out There
Kiryas Joel does not fit comfortably into any of the Court's cases related to
religion and the schools. Two basic categories of cases exist: (1) challenges to
aid to parochial schools or students attending parochial schools and (2)
challenges to authorized religious activity in public schools. 47 Because the
Id.
46 According to Grumet, the legislation "which was adopted to 'solve a religious
problem' was clearly understood by the Legislature and Governor to provide the Satmar
community with an exclusive facility in which their children, whose parents were not
willing to send them into the heterogenous Monroe-Woodbury Central Schools, could
acquire such services in a homogeneous Satmar environment." Brief for Respondent at 39-
40, Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (No. 93-539) (citation to joint appendix omitted). In sharp
contrast, the New York Attorney General asserted the sole purpose was to sensitively meet
the bilingual and bicultural needs of the children which were not and could not be met by
the M-WCSD. See Reply Brief for Petitioner Attorney General of the State of New York at
3, Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (No. 93-539). Moreover, the Attorney General likened the
Kiryas Joel school to schools that catered to Hispanic and Asian students. Id. at 2 n.1.
47 Aid to parochial schools cases: Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct.
2462 (1993) (sign language interpreter for parochial school student); Witters v. Washington
Dep't of Serv. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (aid to blind student attending sectarian
college); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (public school instructors teaching on
premises of parochial schools); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985)
(similar); New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977) (reimbursement to
parochial schools for record keeping and testing mandated by the state); Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229 (1977) (aid to sectarian schools for textbooks, diagnostic services, remedial
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school in Kiryas Joel was purely secular and the programming and instruction
were purely secular, the Court's education cases were not instructive.
Recognizing this, the Court looked elsewhere for guidance. Justice Souter
turned to Larkins v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,48 a case in which the Court
invalidated a Massachusetts statute that granted power to the governing bodies
of churches, synagogues, and schools to veto the liquor license applications of
businesses located within 500 feet of their institutions. 49 Souter stated that the
statute creating the school district was similar to, but more subtle than the one
in Larkin.50 Similar to the State of Massachusettes in Larkin, the State of New
York delegated its "civic authority to a group chosen according to a religious
education, standardized tests, and field trip transportation); Roemer v. Board of Pub.
Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (grants to private colleges); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349
(1975) (textbooks, instructional materials, and various on-site services); Committee for Pub.
Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (funds for maintenance and repair, tuition
reimbursement, and tax benefits to parents); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S.
472 (1973) (funds for testing); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (revenue bonds for
sectarian-affiliated universities); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (federal
construction grants); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (teachers' salaries,
textbooks, and instructional materials); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)
(textbooks); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (bus transportation).
Religious activity in public schools cases: Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992)
(prayer at graduation ceremony); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (statute
prohibiting teaching of evolution unless accompanied by instruction in theory of "creation
science"); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (period of silence for "meditation or
voluntary prayer"); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (posting of Ten
Commandments); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (statute barring instruction in
theory of evolution); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (prayer and
Bible reading at beginning of each school day); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)
(prayer); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (religious instruction in public
schools by sectarian teachers); see also Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993) (use of school premises by religious group); Westside
Community Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (same); Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263 (1981) (same); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (states may not
compel parents to cause children's school attendance when contrary to religious practice);
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (students released from public school classes for
religious instruction).
48 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
49 Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2487
(1994).
5 0 Id. at 2488.
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criterion." 51 Nevertheless, Souter observed that the statute in Kiryas Joel
differed because it did not directly delegate authority to the religious leaders,
but gave the authority to the voters of Kiryas Joel. 52 Souter declared that this
distinction lacked constitutional significance because it constituted a mere
difference in "form, not substance." 53 Souter explained that "Chapter 748
delegate[d] power not by express reference to the religious beliefs . . . but to
residents . . . . [It] effectively identifie[d] these recipients of governmental
authority by reference to [religious] doctrinal adherence, even though it d[id]
not do so expressly."54
Souter then stated that the legislature's conduct represented an unusual
deviation from the state's plan regarding school districting-the statute created
a district within a district, contrary to the state's traditional practice of
consolidating smaller school districts into single large districts.55 The Village's
school district was, in his estimation, "exceptional to the point of
singularity," 56 and consequently, was "substantially equivalent to defining a
political subdivision and hence the qualification for its franchise by a religious
test, resulting in a purposeful and forbidden 'fusion of governmental and
religious functions.'" 57
Souter next discussed a second malady identifiable through the Larkin lens.
The statute raised a fundamental concern whether the benefit received by the
villagers was one that the legislature would willingly provide equally to other
similarly situated groups. 58 Souter stated that Larkin requires an "'effective
means of guaranteeing' that governmental power will be and has been neutrally
employed."59
In Larkin, the Court was concerned whether the governing bodies of the
various religious groups would exercise the delegated authority without
intentionally advancing their individual religion; whereas, Souter explained, the




5 4 Id. at 2489.
55 Id. In the dissent, Scalia stated Souter's claim that the school district's formation was
unique and represented divergence from a state plan was simply untrue. Id. at 2509 (Scalia,
I., dissenting). Scalia pointed to numerous instances in which separate small school districts
were specially formed to remedy special community needs. Id.
5 6 Id. at 2490.
57 Id. (quoting Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126 (1982)).
5 8 Id. at 2491.
59 Id. (quoting Larkn, 459 U.S. at 125).
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legislate fairly in the future for other groups seeking their own school district. 60
Souter declared that the Court could not be certain of governmental neutrality
in future action by the legislature because the courts would be deprived of the
opportunity to review the legislature's conduct if the legislature failed to enact
the same special legislation for a similarly situated group. 61 "A legislature's
failure to enact a special law is itself unreviewable." 62 Consequently, by
Souter's logic, the statute was invalid because it violated the Establishment
Clause requirement of governmental neutrality-a neutrality not related to the
analysis of the statute itself or its particular application, but a formalistic
neutrality that requires speculation about the government's future conduct.
Thus, the statute was infirm for two reasons: (1) it impermissibly aided a
particular religious group; and (2) it permitted the legislature the opportunity to
non-neutrally decide similar situations in the future. From this, one can only
conclude that Souter believes the Establishment Clause requires absolute
neutrality-a neutrality at the present observable level and present symbolic
level, as well as, a guarantee of neutrality in the future.
Finally, Souter offered the villagers, the State of New York, and the M-
WCSD a bit of advice. He stated that there is "'ample room under the
Establishment Clause for benevolent neutrality which [would] permit religious
exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference, government
may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and ... may do so
without violating the Establishment Clause.'" 63 He recommended that the
children either receive their special education in the M-WCSD schools, or that
M-WCSD provide neutral site education in the Village near one of the private
schools. 64 This recommendation, of course, forgets the controversy's history.
The villagers attempted to educate their children in the existing M-WCSD
schools, but found this arrangement unsatisfactory and sought a neutral-site
60 Id. It is in this context that we discern a critical distinction between Larkin and
Kiryas Joel. In Larkin, the Court seemed especially sensitive to the fact that the
Massachusetts Legislature granted unrestricted veto power to religious entities' ruling bodies
without providing any accountability safeguards. The statute in Kiryas Joel, on the contrary,
established a school district whose governance and operation fell snugly within the whole
panoply of New York State education legislation. The villagers were in no way exempted
from any of these. Souter's distinction seems makeshift and outright irrational. One needs a
real leap of faith to arrive on the same side as Souter.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 2492 (citations omitted).
64 Id. at 2493.
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program.65 Unfortunately, their request previously had been denied. Had it
not, the case would not have been before the Court.
Frankly, Souter's opinion demonstrates the worst aspects of the Court's
eisegetical approach to the Establishment Clause. The Court appears to have
started from the conclusion that the statute was unconstitutional, then worked
the conclusion into a pseudological framework supposedly supported by the
Court's own line of cases. Unfortunately, the fabricated rationale is neither well
reasoned, nor does it meaningfully synthesize and apply prior Establishment
Clause jurisprudence in a way that would beneficially advance this troubled
area of constitutional law. 66 In addition, the concurrences that follow the
plurality opinion add little more than grist for the mill.
B. The Concurrences
1. Blackmun: This Case Still Squeezes into the Lemon Framework
Justice Blackmun drafted his separate concurrence specifically to assert that
the Court's decision did not "signal[ ] a departure from the principles described
in Lemon v. Kurtzman." 67 Evidently, sensing the Court's growing
dissatisfaction with the Lemon test, Blackmun sought to prop up Lemon by
promoting its relevance to the case. According to Blackmun, the statute was
invalid under the Lemon test's second prong (principal or primary effect) and
third prong (excessive government entanglement). 68 However, Blackmun
offered no explanation to support this assertion other than vaguely stating that
65 See Board of Educ. v. Wieder, 527 N.E.2d 767 (N.Y. 1988).
66 As I have suggested earlier, numerous commentators have criticized the Court's
handling of Establishment Clause cases. Much of the criticism centers upon the Court's
inability to shift from a formal application of its precedent ( i.e., pouring new facts into the
old wineskins of precedent) to the formation of new principles based upon common sense
and sensitivity to our culture's change. See generally John J. Coughlin, Common Sense in
Formation for the Common Good-Justice White's Dissents in the Parochial School Aid
Cases: Patron of Lost Causes or Precursor of Good News, 66 ST. JOHNS L. Rv. 261
(1992); Elizabeth J. Samuels, The Art of Line Drawing: The Establishment Clause and
Public Aid to Religiously Affiliated Cid Care, 69 IND. L.J. 39 (1993); Kaarin Long,
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District: A Misapplication of Establishment Clause
Precedent, 39 S.D. L. RaV. 404 (1994); Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of
Separationism, 62 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 230 (1994); Michael W. McConnell & Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1
(1989).67 Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2494 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
68 Id. at 2495.
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Larkin rested on Lemon. Blackmun's concurrence, consequently, provides little
clarification.
2. Stevens, Blacknun, Ginsburg: Less Drastic Means
Unfortunately, the three Justices patronizingly suggested that "the State
could have taken steps to alleviate the children's fear by teaching their
schoolmates to be tolerant and respectful of Satmar customs. Action of that
kind would raise no constitutional concerns and would further the strong public
interest in promoting diversity and understanding in the public schools." 69 This
advice, however, is almost ludicrous. Supposing it was possible and simple to
reorient the children's non-Satmar schoolmates, 70 the village children still
would daily face the ravages of an unfamiliar and foreign environment.
Further, these village children are special needs children. Their special
susceptibility to otherwise tolerable inconveniences calls for special sensitivity
on the part of all who share responsibility for their needs, including their
special education needs.
The Justices also found fault with the villagers' religious tenets that require
separation and the maintenance of cultural/ethnic distinction, and suggested that
it is inherently wrong for parents to desire that their children remain faithful to
the parents' religious faith. 71 The opinion stated that the fact that the State
69 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
70 Anyone familiar with children and their insensitivity to nonconforming peers will
recognize the absurdity of this recommendation. Just as adults bear prejudices and
unwillingly relinquish them, so too do children. Mere educational intervention will not
prevent such discrimination. If this were so, one would expect that racial and other forms of
invidious discrimination would soon disappear in America. However, it is all too apparent
that in spite of the good and noble efforts of our schools, legislatures, and courts, prejudice
and its outward manifestations survive.
71 Iryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2495. The three Justices exhibit an unusual disregard for
the villagers' beliefs. Unfortunately, they have forgotten (maybe they never knew) that the
Torah teaches that children must honor and obey their parents, and in so doing they will be
blessed. The three Justices impliedly appear to share the belief that the perpetuation of
religious and cultural differences is inherently contrary to our society's goals. This notion
seems very odd and out of place in the present American cultural milieu. The United States
does not profess that the goal of integration is to unify by extinguishing our differences. Our
goal is not like that proclaimed by France's Education Minister Francois Bayrou when he
banned schoolgirls from wearing traditional Islamic veils: "Our choice is integration: to
make a single nation, a country," by removing or hiding differences from public display.
Andrew Gumbel, Covered in Confision, THE GuARDIAN (Manchester), Oct. 6, 1994, at
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accommodated the villagers' differences signified the State's provision of
"official support to cement the attachment of young adherents to a particular
faith." 72 Consequently, in these Justices' opinion, the statute was "[a]ffirmative
state action in aid of segregation .... [It] establish[ed], rather than merely
accommodat[ed] religion." 73
3. O'Connor: Benevolent Neutrality
Justice O'Connor asserted that "[r]eligious needs can be accommodated
through laws that are neutral with regard to religion." 74 However, "'one
religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another,'" 75neither
may government "'favor the adherents of any sect or religious
organization.'" 76 According to O'Connor, the First Amendment requires that
religious adherence or nonadherence not affect one's "'standing in the political
community.'" 77 Thus, when a statute, such as Chapter 748, singles out a
particular religious group upon which to confer a special benefit, the obvious
inequality of treatment invalidates the statute on the basis that it shows
favoritism-it is non-neutral.
O'Connor further stated that a legislature may intentionally accommodate a
religious group, "so long as it is implemented through generally applicable
legislation." 78 Thus, New York could enact neutral statewide legislation that
T10.
Perhaps, beyond believing that
ilt is implicit in the history and character of American public education that the public
schools serve a uniquely public function: the training of American citizens in an
atmosphere free of parochial, divisive, or separatist influences of any sort-an
atmosphere in which children may assimilate a heritage common to all American
groups and religions
Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 241-42 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring),
the three Justices also believe that children should keep their differences at home and to
themselves. In other words, there is a private sphere and a public sphere and the boundaries
should not overlap.
72 I'ryasJoel, 114 S. Ct. at 2495.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 2496 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
75 Id. (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982)).
7 6 Id. (quoting Gillette v. U.S., 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971)).
7 7 Id. (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).7 8 Id. at 2498.
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provided that individual communities, which meet certain criteria (regardless of
whether the community was incidentally a religious enclave), could create their
own independent school districts.79
The final section of O'Connor's opinion is the most significant. In it, she
theorized regarding Establishment Clause jurisprudence. By analogizing to Free
Speech jurisprudence, O'Connor recognized the need for the Court to establish
a new set of tests with narrower applicability. Further, she urged the Court to
stop "shoehorning new problems"8 0 into the Lemon test. Lemon's language has
become dysfunctional and "the slide away from Lemon's unitary approach is
well underway. A return to Lemon, even if possible, would likely be
futile ... "81
Lastly, O'Connor recommended that if the Court in its future cases
dropped the unitary approach and embarked on fashioning narrower tests that
coincide with "homogeneous area[s], the tests may be more precise and
therefore easier to apply[]" allowing more "attention to the specific nuances of
each area[]" and "more consensus" within the Court.8 2 This, of course, would
be a welcome change from the present state of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.
4. Kennedy: Religious Genymandering
Justice Kennedy initially distanced himself from the plurality opinion by
stating that the Court's outcome, while correct, was not based upon the Court's
precedents and forced a "needless restriction upon the legislature's ability to
respond to the unique problems of a particular religious group."8 3 The real
problem, according to Kennedy, was that the legislature created the district "by
drawing political boundaries on the basis of religion." 84 Kennedy stated that
the statute did not "burden nonadherents or discriminate against other religions
as to become an establishment[,]" 8 5 rather, "[blut for the forbidden manner in
which the New York Legislature sought to go about it[s accommodation it]
would have been valid." 86
79 Id.
80 Id. at 2499.
8 1 ld. at 2500.
82 Id.
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In Kennedy's opinion, the legislature's creation of the school district was
valid for three reasons: (1) the legislature "sought to alleviate a specific
identifiable burden on the Satmars' religious practice";8 7 (2) the statute "did
not impose or increase any burden on non-Satmars";88 (3) the statute "cannot
be said[] to favor the Satmar religion to the exclusion of any other" nor can it
be said that it is "'officially preferred.'" 8 9 The legislature failed, however,
when it created an accommodation that "require[d] the government to draw
political [and] electoral boundaries" according to religious criteria. 90 This use
of religion as a line-drawing criterion is clearly forbidden. "In this respect the
Establishment Clause mirrors the Equal Protection Clause. Just as government
may not segregate on account of. . . race, so too it may not segregate on the
basis of religion." 91 Kennedy concluded that the statute constituted a religious
gerrymander,92 and as such, violated the Establishment Clause. 93
5. The Justices Concur in the Judgment, but Do They Agree on
Anything?
The Court's plurality opinion and the four concurring opinions, although
agreeing upon the outcome, defy synthesis. Those who agree with the Court
may believe that at least it ended up on the right side of the issue. Those in
disagreement, however, will find much that prompts concern.
The Court definitely did not abandon Lemon, in spite of its shortcomings.
87 Id. at 2502.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 2504.
91 Id.92 Id. Kennedy analogizes KMryas Joel to Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) in
which the Court invalidated the North Carolina reapportionment plan for being a racial
gerrymander. RMryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2504-05. Interestingly, in Sluav, the Court
indicated that the highly irregular shape of the congressional district was so irrational that it
could not be interpreted other than as an effort to segregate voters on the basis of race. See
Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2820-21. In Kiryas Joel, however, other rational explanations are
obvious-the students' special needs required a special remedy. The purpose of the statute
was not to create a religiously controlled voting district; rather, it was created to provide
nondiscriminatory secular public education. Consequently, Kennedy's religious
gerrymandering theory seems a little stretched.
93 Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2504-05. In the final section of Kennedy's concurrence,
he stated that the problem of the villagers is attributable to the Court's "unfortunate rulings"
in Aguilar and Ball. ld. Kennedy recommended that the Court may need to reconsider the
two cases in the future. Id. at 2505.
1995] 1351
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The Court did not revisit its rulings in Ball and Aguilar, in spite of the obvious
repercussions those cases have created, such as the problem in Kiryas Joel. The
Court did not fashion any new test. On the contrary, the Court offered a slough
of rationales for invalidation without a hint of uniformity or consensus. 94 One
suspects that even Justice O'Connor's call for consensus was lost on the other
Justices.
C. The Dissent
With his characteristic wit and scorn for imprecision, Justice Scalia
attacked the Court's decision by showing its oversights, its failure to perceive
the paradoxical essence of the case, and its faultily rendered conclusions. 95
Scalia launched his attack by distinguishing Kiryas Joel from the Court's other
Establishment Clause cases. He noted that "[tihe school under scrutiny [was] a
public school specifically designed to provide a public secular education to
handicapped students." 96 Thus, Scalia shifted the perspective from scrutinizing
the statute for symbolic or subliminal invalidity to reviewing the school itself
and the students involved. In so doing, Scalia completely refocused the issue
and the attendant discourse.
According to Scalia, none of the Court's cases ever found fault with a
school comprised of students that incidentally shared the same religion.97
Further, the Court had previously "approved the education of students of a
single religion on a neutral site adjacent to a private religious school." 98
Therefore, Scalia asked, if that was permissible, what could be wrong with
providing secular education in a secular school?99 His answer, of course, was
that nothing could be wrong. 1°° Scalia then suggested that the plurality
understood this basic truth, but chose rather to focus upon the school district
94 Perhaps, if one overlooks the divergent logic undertaken to arrive at the Court's
result, one could infer that Souter, Blackmun, Ginsburg, Stevens, and O'Connor agree in
principle that legislatures may not draft legislation that confers a specific benefit to a
particular group that is incidentally of one religion. Under this position, only broadly
applicable legislation would survive the Court's "review." (This inference is, of course,
arguable.)
95 Kryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2505-16 (Scalia, L, dissenting).
96 Id. at 2506.
97 Id.
98 Id. (referring to Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977)).
99 Id.
100 Id. (stating that "[tihere is no danger in educating religious students in a public
school.").
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and the New York Legislature. 10 1
In so doing, Scalia stated, Justice Souter's opinion boiled down to two
arguments supporting the position of the statute's invalidity: (1) "reposing
power in the Kiryas Joel Village School District is the same as reposing power
in a religious group" and (2) the legislature discriminated on the basis of
religion by favoring the Satmar Hasidim. 10 2 Thus, in accordance with these
two arguments, Souter forced his decision into the Larkin framework.
Scalia, however, flatly rejected Souter's belief that Kiryas Joel resembled
Larkin. According to Scalia, Larkin taught that a state may not delegate its
authority directly to a church's governing body.103 Contrary to Souter's belief,
Kityas Joel involved the transfer of power to citizens who incidentally shared
religious beliefs, not the transfer of power to the Grand Rebbe or the Village's
other religious leaders. Consequently, Scalia accused Souter of
"steamrolling... the difference between civil authority held by a church, and
civil authority held by members of a church ... "104 According to Scalia,
conferral of power upon a group of citizens cannot be conferral of power upon
a religious institution, and blurring the distinction is a grave error.105
Scalia also rejected Souter's belief that the New York Legislature's
enactment of the statute was unconstitutional preferential treatment signifying
endorsement of the Satmarers' religion.1°6 Scalia stated that such a contention
is not based upon any rational argument.107 Scalia preferred to give the
legislators the benefit of a presumption that they acted in good faith with the
intention of remedying what amounted to a clash of cultural differences.10 8 It
was Scalia's understanding that the students' differences were not so much an
essential part of their religion as merely an accompaniment of their religious
beliefs. 109 Thus, Scalia stated "it is a remarkable stretch to say that the Act was
motivated by a desire to favor or disfavor a particular religious group."1 10
Scalia then drew attention to Souter's prejudiced insinuation that the school
district boundaries were intentionally drawn on the basis of religion.11' Scalia
argued that the fashioning of a school district coterminous with a village
101 Id. at 2506-07.
102 Id. at 2507.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 2508.
106 Id. at 2509.
1O7 Id.
108 Id. at 2510.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 2511.
11 Id.
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legitimately incorporated under state law could not, and should not be
construed as an intentional "manipulation" of the franchise for religious
purposes. 112 Rather, entirely "secular reasons .. .produced a political unit
whose members happened to share the same religion." 113
Next, Scalia offered an exhortation on the virtues of accommodation, its
precedential foundation, and the legislative tradition. 14 Scalia observed that in
light of history, the Court's opinion in Kiryas Joel showed a new, unnatural
discomfort with accommodation in general. 115 Scalia pointed out that in
consequence to the Court's discomfort, the Court warped Larkin into
supporting the Court's "no guarantee of neutrality" position. 116 Scalia
explained, however, that the Court in Larkin was not concerned "about the
courts' ability to assure the legislature's future neutrality ... "117 Rather, the
concern centered upon the "legislature's ability to assure the neutrality of the
churches to which it had transferred legislative power." 118 Thus, the
application of Larkin was inapposite because the New York Legislature has
control over the conduct of school districts and the schools they govern.119
Scalia concluded that the Court's underlying reason for misapplying Larkin
was based on its faulty notion that courts would be excluded from reviewing
future denials of applications for similar legislative accommodations. 120 Scalia,
however, argued that the Court never required "'up front' assurances" 121 from
legislatures enacting accommodations because guarantees of equal treatment
generally were irrelevant.' 22 This, Scalia intimated, was because traditionally
(as in Kiryas Joel), accommodations were particular to the specific religious
group's need.123 Furthermore, "[m]aking law . . . through highly
particularized rulemaking or legislation, violates ... no principle of fairness,
equal protection, or neutrality, simply because it does not announce in advance
how all future cases (and all future exceptions) will be disposed of." 124
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 2512.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 2513.
117 Id. at 2512.
118 Id. at 2512-13.





124 Id. at 2514.
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Scalia ended by asserting that the Court's decision "takes to new extremes,
a recent tendency in the opinions of th[e] Court to turn the Establishment
Clause into a repealer of our Nation's tradition of religious toleration." 125 The
Court did this, Scalia stated, by casting aside the presumption of validity of a
facially neutral law to invalidate it because the Court did not "trust New York
to be as accommodating toward other religions (presumably those less powerful
than the Satmar Hasidim) in the future." 126
V. UP AGAINST THE WALL
A. Old or New Doctrine?
What is one to make of the six divergent opinions? Souter seems to
recommend testing accommodations to determine whether there is any
possibility that the effected religious adherents are conferred governmental
power. Thus, if governmental power is conferred, the accommodation is per se
invalid if those upon whom the power is conferred are incidentally of one
religion, even if what is conferred is the kind of power one normally attributes
to ordinary citizenship. Ironically, disallowing an accommodation on this basis
seems to represent an impermissible religiously motivated disenfranchisement.
Stevens, Blackmun, and Ginsburg seem to recommend a test that requires
analysis to determine whether a less drastic accommodation is available. Thus,
if any possible remedy can be conceived that does not show awareness or
sensitivity to religious factors, that remedy will be preferred. Consequently, the
remedy that does factor in religion is invalid. In other words, an
accommodation is permissible so long as it does not look too much like an
accommodation.
O'Connor, interestingly, recommends discarding Lemon, but refuses to
proffer any replacement test. Rather, she appears to prefer to allow some new
test or tests to evolve independently in the Court's future Establishment Clause
cases. Until then, her position seems to be that accommodation is valid only if
it results from broad statutory provisions that equally affect all persons.
Citizens with special needs who are incidentally religious adherents may not
seek special redress through the political process. On the contrary, citizens
must seek passage of legislation with statewide applicability. That approach, of
course, if taken literally, would nearly rule out all but the most general
125 Id. at 2516.126 Id. at 2515-16.
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accommodations of religion.127 Further, that approach seems to provoke
subterfuge on the part of legislators seeking to sensitively remedy particular
needs of particularly needy constituents. Consequently, if the New York
Legislature now enacts a statute providing that any village in New York may
create its own independent school district, that statute would be valid.1 28
Kennedy's test for determining valid accommodation hinges upon finding
that political, electoral, and religious boundaries do not coincide. If those
boundaries coincide, even incidentally, the accommodation must fail.
Ironically, Kennedy bases his position upon the Equal Protection Clause,
suggesting that something is inherently wrong with permitting religious people
the same rights as other citizens. Thus, unfortunately like Souter, Kennedy
ironically proposes that disenfranchisement on the basis of religion is
permissible under circumstances like those in Kiryas Joel.
Blackmun, unlike all the other Justices, promoted retention of Lemon. His
stance seems to suggest that because Lemon worked in the past, it still must
work for Kiryas Joel. However, one could argue that the statute was valid by
the Lemon test. First, the statute clearly was not religiously motivated. The
legislature drafted the legislation because it wanted to see that Kiryas Joel's
special needs children received their lawful education, in spite of their ethnic,
cultural, and religious differences. Second, the statute did not advance the
Satmar religion in any way. The statute only accommodated the special needs
of children who were incidentally of one religion. Third, New York's generally
applicable panoply of education laws had built in safeguards to prevent the
school district from running amok. Consequently, no excessive entanglement
could occur. Only the normally expected entanglement between the state and a
school district would be expected.
Scalia, Thomas, and Rehnquist seem resolute in the position that Lemon is
dead. Scalia recommended that the Court acknowledge this fact and move
forward. Unfortunately, his "advice" does not go beyond shooting down the
other Justices' positions. While he called for something new, he offered only
127 Tax exemption for religious organizations and conscientious objection for religious
adherents probably would be consistent with this position. A case like Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972), in which the Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
prevent a state from compelling Amish parents to cause their children, who have graduated
from the eighth grade, to attend formal high school to age 16 probably would not pass
muster. Cases such as Yoder, in which the distinction between free exercise and
establishment is blurred, emphasize the need for a different approach to accommodation
than the rigid analysis that O'Connor's benevolent neutrality entails.
128 Such a statute might encourage villages with concentrations of races to create
school districts to insulate their villages from mixing races.
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that the test should be based upon "our Nation's tradition of religious
toleration." 129
B. A View from the Top of the Wall
The Court is in a precarious position. The Court did not resolve anything
for the lower courts, neither did the Court provide a clear and applicable rule
for courts to follow in the future. Instead, lower courts are left to wonder
whether the Court has authorized discretionary decisions when the outcome
will depend upon the individual judge's subjective analysis and application of
precedent.
The Court could have served better by crafting a new test that would take
into account situations that blur the distinction between Establishment and Free
Exercise. Such a test could analyze a number of factors that could be
independently questioned and collectively balanced against each other. 130 The
129 KyriasJoel, 114 S. Ct. at 2516 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130 Ever since Everson v. Board of Education, the Court seems to have been locked
into a two-dimensional perspective approach that has necessitated understanding church and
state as separate, independently sovereign spheres. As long as one willingly understands
church and state as sovereign entities, one can tolerate the non-overlapping, separationist
position that the Court's absolute neutrality approach requires. However, the two-
dimensional perspective is merely a legal fiction. When confronted with the reality of
persons that are religious adherents, one's understanding of the church as an independent
sovereign sphere must be discarded. This is because a devout religious adherent's
personhood is not separable from her religiosity-the person and the religious belief are
existentially united. Similarly, one cannot separate any single aspect of one's personhood
from all other aspects-a person's political, religious, racial, ethnic, gender aspects are best
understood simultaneously integrated into a single self. Such a person, in the context of the
Court's approach is required to split her personality into two selves-a private religiously
oriented self and a civic, secularly oriented self. Furthermore, under the Court's approach,
legislators may only respond to their constituents' needs in a fragmented, artificial way by
giving recognition to their constituents' secular needs while being forced to disregard their
essential religious nature.
Some will argue that the Court must maintain this legal fiction to uphold the First
Amendment. After all, the Court has adopted and supported the split personality approach
in other areas of its jurisprudence and managed to generate coherent legal doctrines. See,
e.g., United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 44 (1962) (stating "[flor income tax purposes
Congress has seen fit to regard an individual as having two personalities: 'one is [as] a
seeker after profit... ; the other is [as] a creature satisfying his needs as a human .....
as support for disallowing a taxpayer's personal expense deduction).
I would argue, however, that while the split personality approach may work wonders
elsewhere, in the church and state conflicts, the fiction does not work because the Court is
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balancing component of the test I am suggesting would sensitively take into
account cultural, ethnic, and religious factors as mutually inclusive factors,
rather than as separate and distinguishable elements. Consequently, the
presence of a religious factor would not mechanically require the Court to
overreact (as I believe it did in Kiryas Joel) and work backward from a
conclusion of invalidity to a supportive rationale only suggestive of upholding a
vague principle of neutrality. Further, if the Court would apply a more
concrete test, the Court could avoid basing decisions upon undefinable
abstractions that only the Court's idiosyncratic logic permits.
The guiding principle for a multiple perspective multifactor test would be
substantive neutrality, 131 not a formalistic absolute neutrality that demands
complete separation between church and state. Under a multiple perspective
multifactor test, a court reviewing a challenged accommodation or statute
purported to be an unconstitutional accommodation would ask a set of basic
questions from more than a single perspective to determine if, on balance, the
accommodation was substantively neutral. The questions 132 asked might
forced into a constricted, formalistic analysis that inevitably leads to inequities. iryas Joel
serves as a perfect example.
Under a multiple perspective approach, the Court could comfortably give recognition
to the true nature of citizens that are religious adherents. Recognition does not automatically
necessitate endorsement. Recognition merely provides a context of toleration that will
enable the Court to balance the competing values of citizens within our complex and diverse
culture. It is this form of recognition and toleration that seems implicit in the religion
clauses. Perhaps this is what Justice Scalia alluded to.
In addition, under a multiple perspective approach, the Court can avoid the pitfalls of
defining another mechanical test like Lemon that would fail inevitably because of the
fictional basis. A multiple perspective approach incorporates a successive filtering method
that allows for perceptive recognition of distinctions without wholesale adoption of
abstractions subject to conjecture.
131 For a discussion of the Court's ambiguous meaning of neutrality, and of the
distinction between formal and substantive neutrality, see Douglas Laycock, Formal,
Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 993
(1990). See also Mark J. Beutler, Public Funding of Sectarian Education: Establishment
and Free Exercise Clause Implications, 2 GEo. MAsON INDEP. L. REv. 7 (1993).132 The set of questions I offer are merely suggestive of the type of questions that
could be asked in order to appropriately direct the Court's inquiry. While not specifically
restating the Lemon three part test, the questions impliedly incorporate the essence of that
test. However, the questions are asked in accordance with the balancing component of the
test in order to reorient the inquiry to avoid the mechanical application pitfalls of the Lemon
test. The balancing component I am suggesting is derived from recent expressions of the
Court made in the context of both Free Exercise and Establishment Clause cases in which
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include:
(1) Who is benefitted by the accommodation-a person, persons, or a
group/organization?
(a) as the benefit purposely conferred because of the religious
character of the recipient?
(b) Is there only an incidental religious nexus between the
accommodation and the persons benefitted?
(2) How are those in (1) benefitted?
(a) Is it a secular benefit conferred upon religious
persons/organizations?
(i) Does the benefit act as an incentive to religious practice?
(ii) Does the benefit exempt religious practitioners from the
ordinary burdens of citizenry or some burden peculiar to
the beneficiary?
(iii) Does the benefit represent the grant of nontypical or
unusual governmental authority or power with or without
accountability mechanisms?
(b) Is it a religious benefit that allows religious practice by
removal of obstacles?
(c) Is there a substantial governmental interest at stake?
(3) Who is burdened by the accommodation-other citizens, or
groups/organizations?
(a) Is the burden purposely placed because of the
nonbeneficiary's religious/nonreligious character?
(b) Is there only an incidental religious/nonreligious nexus
between the burden and the nonbeneficiary?
(4) How are those in (3) burdened?
(a) Are they disadvantaged in some way? Actually-directly or
indirectly?
(b) Are they coerced in some way? Actually-directly or
indirectly?
the Court balanced compelling state interests against the right of religious adherents and
nonadherents. See generally Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 113 S. Ct.
2217 (1993) (balancing compelling state interests of community health and humane
treatment of animals against the right to ritually sacrifice animals by religious adherents);
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993) (stating
that while school boards may reasonably seek to regulate after-hours school use, denial of
use to a church to show a film solely because of the religious subject matter of the film
violated free speech, and such use by a church would not violate the Establishment Clause);
Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (upholding a Texas sales tax exemption for
religious publications as promotion of legitimate state interest that does not imbalance free
exercise of religion).
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(c) Does the benefit to the beneficiary act as a disincentive to
religious practice of the nonbeneficiary? Actually-directly or
indirectly?
(d) Is there a substantial governmental interest at stake?
Answers to these questions would be weighed and sifted. Questions (1) and
(2) would be balanced against (3) and (4).133 If the answer to (1)(a) is yes, the
inquiry is not concluded as it might be under Lemon (as a violation of the first
prong). The court would proceed to answer questions (2), (3), and (4).
However, if the answer to (1)(b) is yes, then the inquiry could be concluded
because objectively the religion clauses would not be implicated. Incidental
religious nexus would be viewed as harmless because it is not disruptive to
substantive neutrality. The court would not have to venture into subjective
conjecture or worry over symbolic establishments or entanglements.
Likewise, if the answer to (3(b) is yes, no further inquiry is necessary. In
addition, under question (4), no inquiry into hypothetical burdens is required.
There is either an actual (direct or indirect) burden or there is not.
Under a multiple perspective multifactor test inquiry, no individual factor
is dispositive of the outcome, with the exceptions of affirmative answers to
questions (1)(b) or (3)(b). In all other situations, the factors could be compared
to determine whether the actual effect that an accommodation makes disrupts
the substantive neutral balance between church and state. When the balance
remains intact, government may affirmatively act to accommodate the peculiar
needs of the citizenry even when religion is a factor in the government's
decision-making process and when the beneficiaries are religious adherents.
Under this test, the Kiryas Joel holding would likely be different. The
inquiry would focus primarily upon the beneficiaries, the Village's special
133 To correctly orient oneself within the multiple perspective approach, one must
appreciate that "[flor Constitutional purposes, the belief that there is no God or no afterlife,
is as much a religious belief as the belief that there is a God or an afterlife." Laycock, supra
note 131, at 1002. This is necessary in order to effectuate the balance between the
competing values that are inherent in the competing belief systems that conflict in challenges
to accommodations. To view the parties otherwise, would falsely represent one side of the
equation as religious and the other side as independent of belief, i.e., on neutral turf. Courts
could not effectuate a position of religious neutrality because from the outset the conflict
would be deemed focused upon the "religious party's" position. Thus, if only one side of
the conflict is deemed religious, the perspective is skewed. Whereas, if both parties are
deemed religious from the outset, they are immediately on equal footing. Consequently, the
Court can focus upon the real issue of the balance between the benefits and the burdens as
these are distributed to the parties directly or indirectly.
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needs children. The fact that the statute had only an incidental religious nexus
as related to the children as beneficiaries, could conclude the inquiry.
However, since one could also consider the Village a beneficiary of the
government's conferrence of authority, that is, the village itself was granted the
authority to form the school district, the inquiry could be conducted in regard
to the village. If so, the incidental religious nexus of the Village to the Satmar
Hasidim is not determinative and certainly does not automatically cause the
statute to be invalid. Under the balancing component of the test, there appears
to be no religious benefit conferred upon adherents, and no actual burden,
direct or indirect, is apparent in relation to nonbeneficiaries.
Even if the villagers themselves are considered the beneficiaries (and
assuming arguendo one posits that they are not merely incidentally religious
under (1)(b)) the answer to the question under (1)(a), whether the benefit was
purposely conferred because of the religious character of the villagers is no.
Further, under the balancing component of the test, if the benefit and the
burden are juxtaposed, one sees that the statute provided: (1) no actual benefit
to religion, (or to religious adherents, either directly or indirectly); (2) has no
effect upon religious practice for adherents or nonadherents; (3) places no
burdens upon nonbeneficiaries; and (4) does not disadvantage or coerce
nonbeneficiaries. Consequently, in spite of the presence of an apparent
religious factor, the statute would have been valid.
One might ask whether a multiple perspective multifactor test automatically
rules out an angry taxpayer's opportunity to challenge the government's use of
revenues when the taxpayer suspects the government's use is in favor of a
religion. The answer, of course, is that a taxpayer will still have standing to
challenge such alleged governmental action. The burden upon the taxpayer
under a multiple perspective multifactor test remains relatively the same, with
the exception that mere allegations of symbolic wounds by the taxpayer would
no longer support invalidation. The kind of sophistry in which challengers and
courts alike have indulged would no longer suffice. A taxpayer's challenge
would necessitate a demonstrable showing of injury or substantial burden that
outweighs the countervailing substantial state interest in conferring the
accommodation.
Would the adoption of this test open the floodgates to improper legislative
accommodation, and consequently, to more litigation? The answer depends
upon the test and its uniform application. If the Court adopted a test in order to
advance the normative themes expressed in the First Amendment with the
understanding that a heightened level of scrutiny will be applied, legislation
that purposely promotes a religion qua religion will fail automatically.
Legislation that coincidentally allows the sphere of religion and the sphere of
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the state to overlap will not. Inevitably, competing values will not vanish.
However, under a multiple perspective multifactor test, those competing values
may find a compromising balance, a balance presently unavailable under the
Court's approach.
VI. CONCLUSION
Kiryas Joel seems to indicate that the Court is neither settled on how to
interpret its own Establishment Clause case law, nor prepared to discard its old
unworkable tests and construct new tests to move the Court out of the present
doctrinal confusion. The individual Justices' varied rationales which supported
their decisions are too divergent to synthesize.
Proponents of the Court's approach will argue that this case is indicative of
the Court's recent steps toward fashioning a new neutrality doctrine that draws
lines based on Equal Protection jurisprudential doctrines. 134 The traces of these
steps in Kiryas Joel, however, are vague if they are present at all.
Those who believe that the religion clauses do not prohibit religious
communities and individuals from fully sharing in liberal democracy's benefits
may have cause to worry. The Court seems unwilling to accommodate its
Establishment Clause analysis to the changing American cultural milieu.
Diversity's virtue has not yet washed into the Court. Thus, perhaps Justice
Cardozo was wrong when he stated, "[tlhe great tides and currents which
engulf the rest of men, do not turn aside in their course, and pass the judges
by."'135
Finally, Kiryas Joel teaches that governments wishing to sensitively
accommodate special cultural and ethnic needs of groups or individuals must
consider those groups' or individuals' religious adherence. Are religious
accommodations still possible? The Court said yes. However, how far the
Court will allow accommodation to go is still unknown. Perhaps the Court
should heed Alexander M. Bickel's caution: "No society, certainly not a large
and heterogeneous one, can fail in time to explode if it is deprived of the arts of
compromise, if it knows no way of muddling through. No good society can be
unprincipled; and no viable society can be principle-ridden." 136
134 See generally PAUL I. WEBER & DENNIS A. GILBERT, PRIVATE CHURCHES AND
PUBLIC MONEY: CHURCH-GOVERNMENT FISCAL RELATIONS (1981).
135 BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921).
136 JOIN WEBB PRATr, RELIGION, POLITICS AND DIvERsrrY 316 (1967) (quoting from
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 64 (1962)).
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